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ABSTRACT
As network security monitoring grows more sophisticated, there is
an increasing need for outsourcing such tasks to third-party ana-
lysts. However, organizations are usually reluctant to share their
network traces due to privacy concerns over sensitive information,
e.g., network and system configuration, which may potentially be
exploited for attacks. In cases where data owners are convinced
to share their network traces, the data are typically subjected to
certain anonymization techniques, e.g., CryptoPAn, which replaces
real IP addresses with prefix-preserving pseudonyms. However,
most such techniques either are vulnerable to adversaries with
prior knowledge about some network flows in the traces, or require
heavy data sanitization or perturbation, both of which may result
in a significant loss of data utility. In this paper, we aim to pre-
serve both privacy and utility through shifting the trade-off from
between privacy and utility to between privacy and computational
cost. The key idea is for the analysts to generate and analyze multi-
ple anonymized views of the original network traces; those views
are designed to be sufficiently indistinguishable even to adversaries
armed with prior knowledge, which preserves the privacy, whereas
one of the views will yield true analysis results privately retrieved
by the data owner, which preserves the utility. We present the gen-
eral approach and instantiate it based on CryptoPAn. We formally
analyze the privacy of our solution and experimentally evaluate it
using real network traces provided by a major ISP. The results show
that our approach can significantly reduce the level of information
leakage (e.g., less than 1% of the information leaked by CryptoPAn)
with comparable utility.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As the owners of large-scale network data, today’s ISPs and enter-
prises usually face a dilemma. As security monitoring and analytics
grow more sophisticated, there is an increasing need for those
organizations to outsource such tasks together with necessary net-
work data to third-party analysts, e.g., Managed Security Service
Providers (MSSPs) [1]. On the other hand, those organizations are
typically reluctant to share their network trace data with third par-
ties, and even less willing to publish them, mainly due to privacy
concerns over sensitive information contained in such data. For
example, important network configuration information, such as
potential bottlenecks of the network, may be inferred from network
traces and subsequently exploited by adversaries to increase the
impact of a denial of service attack [2].
In cases where data owners are convinced to share their network
traces, the traces are typically subjected to some anonymization
techniques. The anonymization of network traces has attracted
significant attention (a more detailed review of related works will
be given in section 6). For instance, CryptoPAn replaces real IP
addresses inside network flows with prefix preserving pseudonyms,
such that the hierarchical relationships among those addresses
will be preserved to facilitate analyses [3]. Specifically, any two IP
addresses sharing a prefix in the original trace will also do so in the
anonymized trace. However, CryptoPAn is known to be vulnerable
to the so-called fingerprinting attack and injection attack [4–6].
In those attacks, adversaries either already know some network
flows in the original traces (by observing the network or from
other relevant sources, e.g., DNS and WHOIS databases) [7], or
have deliberately injected some forged flows into such traces. By
recognizing those known flows in the anonymized traces based on
unchanged fields of the flows, namely, fingerprints (e.g., timestamps
and protocols), the adversaries can extrapolate their knowledge to
recognize other flows based on the shared prefixes [4]. We now
demonstrate such an attack in details.
Example 1.1. In Figure 1, the upper table shows the original trace,
and the lower shows the trace anonymized using CryptoPAn. In this
example, without loss of generality, we only focus on source IPs. Inside
each table, similar prefixes are highlighted through similar shading.
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Original Trace
Start Time Src
Port
Dst
Port
P Pkts ScrIPaddr
10:23:42:50 902 600 UDP 6 10.1.1.0
10:23:42:53 901 2000 UDP 8 150.10.10.1
10:23:43:54 900 63 UDP 10 128.10.10.1
10:53:42:54 800 1900 TCP 2 10.1.1.0
10:53:42:55 750 2330 TCP 1 150.10.1.0
10:53:42:56 220 591 TCP 1 150.10.20.0
10:53:42:57 22 2600 TCP 1 10.1.1.0
CryptoPAn Output
Start Time Src
Port
Dst
Port
P Pkts ScrIPaddr
10:23:42:50 902 600 UDP 6 117.14.242.125     
10:23:42:53 901 2000 UDP 8 159.61.5.252
10:23:43:54 900 63 UDP 10 135.243.4.124
10:53:42:54 800 1900 TCP 2 117.14.242.125
10:53:42:55 750 2330 TCP 1 159.61.13.126
10:53:42:56 220 591 TCP 1 159.61.20.124
10:53:42:57 22 2600 TCP 1 117.14.242.125
Step1: 
Injecting flows
Step4: 
De-anonymizing 
IPs or prefixes
Step3: 
Identifying more 
flows via shared 
prefixes
Step2: 
Recognizing injected 
flows via Start Time 
and Src Port
Figure 1: An example of injection attack
(1) Step 1: An adversary has injected three network flows, shown
as the first three records in the original trace (upper table).
(2) Step 2: The adversary recognizes the three injected flows in the
anonymized trace (lower table) through unique combinations
of the unchanged attributes (Start Time and Src Port).
(3) Step 3: He/she can then extrapolate his/her knowledge from the
injected flows to real flows as follows, e.g., since prefix 159.61
is shared by the second (injected), fifth (real) and sixth (real)
flows, he/she knows all three must also share the same prefix in
the original trace. Such identified relationships between flows
in the two traces will be called matches from now on.
(4) Step 4: Finally, he/she can infer the prefixes or entire IPs of
those anonymized flows in the original traces, as he/she knows
the original IPs of his/her injected flows, e.g., the fifth and sixth
flows must have prefix 150.10, and the IPs of the fourth and
last flows must be 10.1.1.0.
More generally, a powerful adversary who can probe all the subnets
of a network using injection or fingerprinting can potentially de-
anonymize the entire CryptoPAn output via a more sophisticated
frequency analysis attack [4].
Most subsequent solutions either require heavy data sanitiza-
tion or can only support limited types of analysis. In particular,
the (k, j)-obfuscation method first groups together k or more flows
with similar fingerprints and then bucketizes (i.e., replacing original
IPs with identical IPs) j < k flows inside each group; all records
whose fingerprints are not sufficiently similar to k − 1 others will
be suppressed [2]. Clearly, both the bucketization and suppression
may lead to significant loss of data utility. The differentially private
analysis method first adds noises to analysis results and then pub-
lishes such aggregated results [17, 41, 42]. Although this method
may provide privacy guarantee regardless of adversarial knowl-
edge, the perturbation and aggregation prevent its application to
analyses that demand accurate or detailed records in the network
traces.
In this paper, we aim to preserve both privacy and utility by shift-
ing the trade-off from between privacy and utility, as seen in most
existing works, to between privacy and computational cost (which
has seen a significant decrease lately, especially with the increasing
popularity of cloud technology). The key idea is for the data owner
to send enough information to the third party analysts such that
they can generate and analyze many different anonymized views of
the original network trace; those anonymized views are designed
to be sufficiently indistinguishable (which will be formally defined
in subsection 2.4) even to adversaries armed with prior knowledge
and performing the aforementioned attacks, which preserves the
privacy; at the same time, one of the anonymized views will yield
true analysis results, which will be privately retrieved by the data
owner or other authorized parties, which preserves the utility. More
specifically, our contributions are as follows.
(1) We propose a multi-view approach to the prefix-preserving
anonymization of network traces. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first known solution that can achieve similar
data utility as CryptoPAn does, while being robust against
the so-called semantic attacks (e.g., fingerprinting and injec-
tion). In addition, we believe the idea of shifting the trade-off
from between privacy and utility to between privacy and
computational cost may potentially be adapted to improve
other privacy solutions.
(2) In addition to the general multi-view approach, we detail a
concrete solution based on iteratively applying CryptoPAn
to each partition inside a network trace such that different
partitions are anonymized differently in all the views except
one (which yields valid analysis results that can be privately
retrieved by the data owner). In addition to privacy and
utility, we design the solution in such a way that only one
seed view needs to be sent to the analysts, which avoids
additional communication cost.
(3) We formally analyze the level of privacy guarantee achieved
using our method, discuss potential attacks and solutions,
and finally experimentally evaluate our solution using real
network traces from a major ISP. The experimental results
confirm that our solution is robust against semantic attacks
with a reasonable computational cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines our
models. Sections 3 introduces building blocks for our schemes. Sec-
tion 4 details two concrete multi-view schemes based on CryptoPAn.
Sections 5 presents the experimental results. Section Appendix 4.3
provides more discussions, and section 6 reviews the related work.
Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
2 MODELS
In this section, we describe models for the system and adversaries;
we briefly review CryptoPAn; we provide a high level overview of
our multi-view approach; finally, we define our privacy property.
Essential definitions and notations are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: The Notation Table.
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition
L Original network trace L∗ Anonymized trace
AIP IP attributes: source and destination IP fp-QI Fingerprint quasi identifier
ri Record number i n Number of records in L
α Number of IP prefixes known by the attacker Sα The set of addresses known by attacker
S∗0 The set of IP addresses in the seed view S∗i The set of IP addresses in view i
PP CryptoPAn function RPP Reverse of CryptoPAn
Pi Partition i m Number of partitions in L
r Index of real view K0, K1 Private key and outsourced key
2.1 The System and Adversary Model
Denote by L a network trace comprised of a set of flows (or records)
ri . Each flow includes a confidential multi-value attribute AIP =
{IPsrc , IPdst }, and the set of other attributes A = {Ai } is called
the Fingerprint Quasi Identifier (fp-QI) [2]. Suppose the data owner
would like the analyst to perform an analysis on L to produce a
report Γ. To ensure privacy, instead of sendingL, an anonymization
function T is applied to obtain an anonymized version L∗. Thus,
our main objective is to find the anonymization function T to pre-
serve both the privacy, which means the analyst cannot obtain T or
L from L∗, and utility, which means T must be prefix-preserving.
In this context, we make following assumptions (similar to those
found in most existing works [3–6]). i) The adversary is a honest-
but-curious analyst (in the sense that he/she will exactly follow the
approach) who can observe L∗. ii) The anonymization function
T is publicly known, but the corresponding anonymization key
is not known by the adversary. iii) The goal of the adversary is to
find all possible matches (as demonstrated in Example 1.1, an IP
address may be matched to its anonymized version either through
the fp-QI or shared prefixes) between L and L∗. iv) Suppose L
consists of d groups each of which contains IP addresses with
similar prefixes (e.g., those in the same subset), and among these
the adversary can successfully inject or fingerprint α (≤ d) groups
(e.g., the demilitarized zone (DMZ) or other subnets to which the
adversary has access). Accordingly, we say that the adversary has
Sα knowledge. v) Finally, we assume the communication between
the data owner and the analyst is over a secure channel, and we
do not consider integrity or availability issues (e.g., a malicious
adversary may potentially alter or delete the analysis report).
2.2 The CryptoPAn Model
To facilitate further discussions, we briefly review the CryptoPAn [3]
model, which gives a baseline for prefix-preserving anonymization.
Definition 2.1. Prefix-preserving Anonymization [3]: Given
two IP addresses a = a1a2....a32 andb = b1b2....b32, and a one-to-one
function F (.) : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32, we say that
- a and b share a k-bit prefix (0 ≤ k ≤ 32), if and only if
a1a2....ak = b1b2....bk , and ak+1 , bk+1.
- F is prefix-preserving, if, for any a and b that share a k-bit
prefix, F (a) and F (b) also do so.
Given a = a1a2 · · ·a32 and F (a) = a′1a′2 . . . a′32, the prefix-
preserving anonymization function F must necessarily satisfy the
canonical form [3], as follows.
a′i = ai ⊕ fi−1(a1a2 · · ·ai−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , 32 (1)
where fi is a cryptographic function which, based on a 256/128-
bit key K , takes as input a bit-string of length i −1 and returns a sin-
gle bit. Intuitively, the ith bit is anonymized based onK and the pre-
ceding i−1 bits to satisfy the prefix-preserving property. The crypto-
graphic function fi can be constructed as L
(
R
(
P(a1a2 . . . ai−1),K
) )
where L returns the least significant bit, R can be a block cipher
such as Rijndael [30], and P is a padding function that expands
a1,a2, . . . ,ai−1 to match the block size of R [3]. In the following,
PP will stand for this CryptoPAn function and its output will be
denoted by a′ = PP(a,K).
The advantage of CryptoPAn is that it is deterministic and al-
lows consistent prefix-preserving anonymization under the same
K . However, as mentioned earlier, CryptoPAn is vulnerable to se-
mantic attacks, which will be addressed in next section.
2.3 The Multi-View Approach
We propose a novel multi-view approach to the prefix-preserving
anonymization of network traces. The objective is to preserve both
the privacy and the data utility, while being robust against semantic
attacks. The key idea is to hide a prefix-preserving anonymized
view, namely, the real view, among N − 1 other fake views, such
that an adversary cannot distinguish between those N views, either
using his/her prior knowledge or through semantic attacks. Our
approach is depicted in Figure 2 and detailed below.
2.3.1 Privacy Preservation at the Data Owner Side.
Step 1: The data owner generates two CryptoPAn keys K0 and K1,
and then obtains an anonymized trace using the anonymiza-
tion function PP (which will be represented by the gear icon
inside this figure) and K0. This initial anonymization step is
designed to prevent the analyst from simulating the process
as K0 will never be given out. Note that this anonymized
trace is still vulnerable to semantic attack and must undergo
the remaining steps. Besides, generating this anonymized
trace will actually be slightly more complicated due to mi-
gration as discussed later in Section 3.3.
Step 2: The anonymized trace is then partitioned (the partitioning
algorithms will be detailed in Sections 3.2 and 4).
Step 3: Each partition is anonymized using PP and key K1, but
the anonymization will be repeated, for a different number
of times, on different partitions. For example, as the figure
shows, the first partition is anonymized only once, whereas
the second for three times, etc. The result of this step is called
the seed trace. The idea is that, as illustrated by the different
graphic patterns inside the seed trace, different partitions
have been anonymized differently, and hence the seed trace
in its entirety is no longer prefix-preserving, even though
each partition is still prefix-preserving (note that this is only
a simplified demonstration of the seed trace generator scheme
which will be detailed in Section 4).
Step 4: The seed trace together with some supplementary parame-
ters, including K1, are outsourced to the analyst.
2.3.2 Utility Realization at the Data Analyst Side.
Step 5: The analyst generates totallyN views based on the received
seed view and supplementary parameters. Our design will
ensure one of those generated views, namely, the real view,
will have all its partitions anonymized in the same way, and
thus be prefix-preserving (detailed in Section 4), though the
analyst (adversary) cannot tell which exactly is the real view.
Step 6: The analyst performs the analysis on all the N views and
generates corresponding reports.
Step 7: The data owner retrieves the analysis report correspond-
ing to the real view following an oblivious random access
memory (ORAM) protocol [23], such that the analyst cannot
learn which view has been retrieved.
Next, we define the privacy property for the multi-view solution.
ORAM
Data
Owner
Anonymized 
trace
Original
trace
Partitioned 
trace
Seed
trace 
  
Step3: Generating 
seed trace 
  
Step4:Outsourcing the 
seed trace and parameters  
Seed
trace 
Data
Analyst

  
Step1: Initial 
Anonymization 
Step2: Trace 
partitioning
Step5: Generating 
multi-views
Step6: Analyzing 
generated traces
Step7: Real 
report retrieval
Privacy Preservation
Utility Realization
K0
K1
K1
Figure 2: An overview of the multi-view approach
2.4 Privacy Property against Adversaries
Under our multi-view approach, an analyst (adversary) will receive
N different traces with identical fp-QI attribute values and different
AI P attribute values. Therefore, his/her goal now is to identify the
real view among all the views, e.g., he/she may attempt to observe
his/her injected or fingerprinted flows, or he/she can launch the
aforementioned semantic attacks on those views, hoping that the
real view might respond differently to those attacks. Therefore, the
main objective in designing an effective multi-view solution is to
satisfy the indistinguishability property which means the real view
must be sufficiently indistinguishable from the fake views under se-
mantic attacks. Motivated by the concept ofDifferential Privacy [37],
we propose the ϵ-indisinguishablity property as follows.
Definition 2.2. ϵ-Indisinguishable Views: A multi-view solu-
tion is said to satisfy ϵ-Indistinguishability against an Sα adversary
if and only if (both probabilities below are from the adversary’s point
of view)
∃ ϵ ≥ 0, s.t. ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N } ⇒
e−ϵ ≤ Pr (view i may be the real view )
Pr (view r may be the real view) ≤ e
ϵ (2)
In Defintion 2.2, a smaller ϵ value is more desirable as it means
the views are more indistinguishable from the real view to the
adversary. For example, an extreme case of ϵ = 0 would mean all
the views are equally likely to be the real view to the adversary
(from now on, we call these views the real view candidates). In
practice, the value of ϵ would depend on the specific design of a
multi-view solution and also on the adversary’s prior knowledge,
as will be detailed in following sections.
Finally, since themulti-view approach requires outsourcing some
supplementary parameters, we will also need to analyze the secu-
rity/privacy of the communication protocol (privacy leakage in
the protocol, which complements the privacy analysis in output
of the protocol) in semi-honest model under the theory of secure
multiparty computation (SMC) [43], [44] (see section 4.2.4).
3 THE BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we introduce the building blocks for our multi-view
mechanisms, namely, the iterative and reverse CryptoPAn, partition-
based prefix preserving, and CryptoPAn with IP-collision (migration).
3.1 Iterative and Reverse CryptoPAn
As mentioned in section 2.3, the multi-view approach relies on
iteratively applying a prefix preserving function PP for generating
the seed view. Also, the analyst will invert such an application of PP
in order to obtain the real view (among fake views). Therefore, we
first need to show how PP can be iteratively and reversely applied.
First, it is straightforward that PP can be iteratively applied, and
the result also yields a valid prefix-preserving function. Specifically,
denote by PP j (a,K) (j > 1) the iterative application of PP on IP
address a using key K , where j is the number of iterations, called
the index. For example, for an index of two, we have PP2(a,K) =
PP(PP(a,K),K). It can be easily verified that given any two IP
addresses a and b sharing a k-bit prefix, PP i (a,K) and PP i (b,K)
will always result in two IP addresses that also share a k-bit prefix
(i.e., PP i is prefix-preserving). More generally, the same also holds
for applying PP under a sequence of indices and keys (for both IPs),
e.g., PP i (PP j (a,K0),K1) and PP i (PP j (b,K0),K1) will also share k-
bit prefix. Finally, for a set of IP addresses S, iterative PP using a
single key K satisfies the following associative property:
∀S,K , and i, j ∈ Z (inteдers) : PP i (PP j (S,K),K )
= PP j
(
PP i (S,K),K ) = PP (i+j) (S,K ) (3)
On the other hand, when a negative number is used as the in-
dex, we have a reverse iterative CryptPAn function (RPP for short),
as formally characterized in Theorem 3.1 (the proof is in Appen-
dix A.1).
Theorem 3.1. Given IP addresses a = a1a2 · · ·a32 and b =
PP(a,K) = b1b2 · · ·b32, the function RPP(·) : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32
defined as
RPP(b,K) = c = c1c2 · · · c32
where ci = bi ⊕ fi−1(c1 · · · ci−1) (4)
is the inverse of the PP function given in Equation 1, i.e., c = a.
3.2 Partition-based Prefix Preserving
As mentioned in section 2.3, the central idea of the multi-view
approach is to divide the trace into partitions (Step 2), and then
anonymize those partitions iteratively, but for different number of
iterations (Step 3). In this subsection, we discuss this concept.
GivenS as a set ofn IP addresses, wemay divideS into partitions
in various ways, e.g., forming equal-sized partitions after sorting S
based on either the IP addresses or corresponding timestamps. The
partitioning scheme will have a major impact on the privacy, and
we will discuss two such schemes in next section.
Once the trace is divided into partitions, we can then apply PP on
each partition separately, denoted by PP(Pi ,K) for the ith partition.
Specifically, givenS divided as a set ofm partitions {P1, P2, · · · , Pm },
we define a key vector V =
[
v1 v2 · · · vm
]
where each vi
is a positive integer indicating the number of times PP should be
applied to Pi , namely, the key index of Pi . Given a cryptographic
key K , we can then define the partition-based prefix preserving
anonymization of S as PP(S,V ,K) = [PPv1 (P1,K), PPv2 (P2,K),
. . . , PPvm (Pm ,K)
]
.
We can easily extend the associative property in Equation 3 to
this case as the following (which will play an important role in
designing our multi-view mechanisms in next section).
PP[PP(S,V1,K),V2,K] = PP(S, (V1 +V2),K) (5)
3.3 IP Migration: Introducing IP-Collision into
CryptoPAn
As mentioned in section 2.3, once the analyst (adversary) receives
the seed view, he/she would generate many indistinguishable views
among which only one, the real view, will be prefix preserving
across all the partitions, while the other (fake) views do not pre-
serve prefixes across the partitions (Step 5). However, the design
would have a potential flaw under a direct application of Cryp-
toPAn. Specifically, since the original CryptoPAn design is collision
resistant [3], the fact that similar prefixes are only preserved in
the real view across partitions would allow an adversary to easily
distinguish the real view from others.
Example 3.1. Figure 3 illustrates this flaw. The original trace in-
cludes three different addresses and has been divided into two par-
titions P1 and P2. As illustrated in the figure, the real view is easily
distinguishable from the two fake views as the shared prefixes (159.61)
between addresses in P1 and P2 only appear in the real view. This
is because, since the partitions in fake views have different rounds
of PP applied, and since the original CryptoPan design is collision
𝑃𝑃4(𝑃1)
CryptoPAn (Collision Resistant)
144.5.116.249 50.19.13.26 159.61.5.252
39.250.139.225 83.180.10.3 135.243.4.124
17.8.78.28 159.61.20.124 159.61.20.124
150.10.10.1
128.10.10.1
150.10.20.0
𝑃𝑃2(𝑃1) 𝑃𝑃 (𝑃1)𝑃1
𝑃2 𝑃𝑃5(𝑃2)𝑃𝑃
3(𝑃2) 𝑃𝑃(𝑃2)
3-View Defense 
Original 
Trace
Fake View 1 Fake View 2 Real View 
Figure 3: An example showing only the real view contains
shared prefixes (which allows it to be identified by
adversaries)
resistant [3], the shared prefixes will no longer appear. Hence, the
adversary can easily distinguish the real view from others.
To address this issue, our idea is to create collisions between
different prefixes in fake views, such that adversaries cannot tell
whether the shared prefixes are due to prefix preserving in the
real view, or due to collisions in the fake views. However, due to
the collision resistance property of CryptoPAn [3], there is only a
negligible probability that different prefixes may become identical
even after applying different iterations of PP, as shown in the above
example. Therefore, our key idea of IP migration is to first replace
the prefixes of all the IPs with common values (e.g., zeros), and then
fabricate new prefixes for them by applying different iterations of
PP. This IP migration process is designed to be prefix-preserving
(i.e,. any IPs sharing prefixes in the original trace will still share
the new prefixes), and to create collisions in fake views since the
addition of key indices during view generation can easily collide.
Next, we demonstrate this IP migration technique in an example.
𝑃𝑃𝟏(0.0.20.0)=    
11.215.10.28
2-View Defense 
Original 
Trace
Removing 
Prefixes
Migration Fake View 
(Collision)
Real View 
(Prefix Preserving)
150.10.10.1
150.10.20.0
128.10.10.1
0.0.10.1
0.0.20.0
0.0.10.1
𝑃𝑃1
𝑃𝑃1
𝑃𝑃2
𝑃1
Group 1
Group 2
Group 1
𝑃𝑃𝟏(0.0.20.0)=    
11.215.31.108
𝑃𝑃2(0.0.10.1)=
95.24.141.20
𝑃2
𝑃𝑃𝟐=
95.24.25.30
𝑃1
𝑃𝑃1 =
11.215.31.108
𝑃𝑃𝟐=
95.24.141.20
𝑃2
𝑃𝑃1
𝑃𝑃0
𝑃𝑃𝟐=
95.24.25.30
𝑃1
𝑃𝑃𝟐=
95.24.45.35
𝑃𝑃3=
70.11.01.43
𝑃2
𝑃𝑃0
𝑃𝑃1
Group 1
Group 1
Group 2
Figure 4: An example showing, by removing shared
prefixes and fabricating them with the same rounds of PP,
both fake view and real view may now contain fake or real
shared prefixes (which makes them indistinguishable)
Example 3.2. In Figure 4, the first stage shows the same original
trace as in Example 3.1. In the second stage, we “remove” the prefixes
of all IPs and replace them with all zeros (by xoring them with their
own prefixes). Next, in the third stage, we fabricate new prefixes by
applying different iterations of PP in a prefix preserving manner, e.g.,
the first two IPs still sharing a common prefix (11.215) different from
that of the last IP. However, note that whether two IPs share the new
prefixes only depends on their key indices now, e.g., 1 for first two IPs
and 2 for the last IP. This is how we can create collisions in the next
stage (the fake view) where the first and last IPs coincidentally share
the same prefix 95.24 due to their common key indices 2 (however,
note these are the addition results of different key indices from the
migration stage and the view generation stage, respectively). Now, the
adversary will not be able to tell which of those views is real based on
the existence of shared prefixes.
We now formally define the migration function in the following.
Definition 3.1. Migration Function: Let S be a set of IP ad-
dresses consists of d groups of IPs S1, S2, · · · , Sd with distinct prefixes
s1, s2, · · · , sd respectively, and K be a random CryptoPAn key. Mi-
gration functionM : S × C(set of positive integers) → S∗ is defined
as
S∗ = M(S) = {S∗i |∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,d}}
where S∗i = {PPci (si ⊕ aj ,K),∀aj ∈ Si } (6)
where C = PRNG(d,d) = {c1, c2, · · · , cd } is the set of d non-
repeating random key indices generated between [1,d] using a cryp-
tographically secure pseudo random number generator.
4 ϵ-INDISTINGUISHABLE MULTI-VIEW
MECHANISMS
We first present a multi-view mechanism based on IP partitioning
in Section 4.1. We then propose a more refined scheme based on
distinct IP partitioning with key vector generator in Section 4.2.
4.1 Scheme I: IP-based Partitioning Approach
To realize the main ideas of multi-view anonymization, as intro-
duced in Section 2.3, we need to design concrete schemes for each
step in Figure 2. The key idea of our first scheme is the following.
We divide the original trace in such a way that all the IPs sharing
prefixes will always be placed in the same partition. This will pre-
vent the attack described in Section 3.3, i.e., identifying the real
view by observing shared prefixes across different partitions. As
we will detail in Section 4.1.4, this scheme can achieve perfect in-
distinguishability without the need for IP migration (introduced in
Section 3.3), although it has its limitations which will be addressed
in our second scheme. Both schemes are depicted in Figure 5 and
detailed below.
Specifically, our first scheme includes three main steps: privacy
preservation (Section 4.1.1), utility realization (Section 4.1.2), and
analysis report extraction (Section 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Privacy Preservation (Data Owner). The data owner per-
forms a set of actions to generate the seed trace L∗0 together with
some parameters to be sent to the analyst for generating different
views. These actions are summarized in Algorithm 1, and detailed
in the following.
• Applying CryptoPAn using K0: First, the data owner gener-
ates two independent keys, namely K0 (key used for initial
anonymization, which never leaves the data owner) and K
(key used for later anonymization steps). The data owner
then generates the initially anonymized traceL0=PP(L,K0).
This step is designed to prevent the adversary from simu-
lating the scheme, e.g., using a brute-force attack to revert
the seed trace back to the original trace in which he/she can
recognize some original IPs. The leftmost block in Figure 5
shows an example of the initially anonymized trace.
• Trace partitioning based on IP-value: The initially anonymized
trace is partitioned based on IP values. Specifically, let S
be the set of IP addresses in L0 consisting of d groups of
IPs S1, S2, · · · , Sd with distinct prefixes s1, s2, · · · , sd , respec-
tively; we divide L0 to d partitions, each of which is the
collection of all records containing one of these groups. For
example, the upper part of Figure 5 depicts how our first
scheme works. The set of three IPs are divided into two par-
titions where P1 includes both IPs sharing the same prefix,
45.20.15.89 and 45.20.141.20, whereas the last IP 121.25.01.08
goes to P2 since it does not share a prefix with others.
• Seed trace creation: The data owner in this step generates
the seed trace using a d-size (recall that d is the number of
partitions) random key vector.
– Generating a random key vector: The data owner generates
a random vector V of size d using a cryptographically
secure pseudo random number generator PRNG(d ,d)
(which generates a set ofd non-repeating randomnumbers
between [1,d]). This vector V and the key K will later be
used by the analyst to generate different views from the
seed trace. For example, in Figure 5, for the two partitions,
V =
[
1 2
]
is generated. Finally, the data owner chooses
the total number of views N to be generated later by the
analyst, based on his/her requirement about privacy and
computational overhead, since a larger N will mean more
computation by both the data owner and analyst but also
more privacy (more real view candidates will be generated
which we will further study this through experiments
later).
– Generating a seed trace key vector and a seed trace: The data
owner picks a random number r ∈ [1,N ] and then com-
putesV0 = −r ·V as the key vector of seed trace. Next, the
data owner generates the seed trace asL∗0 = PP(L0,V0,K).
This ensures, after the analysts applies exactly r iterations
of V on the seed trace, he/she would get L0 back (while
not being aware of this fact since he/she does not know r ).
For example, in Figure 5, r = 3 and V0 =
[−3 −6] . We
can easily verify that, if the analyst applies the indices inV
on the seed trace three times, the outcome will be exactly
L0 (the real view). This can be more formally stated as
follows (the r th view L∗r is actually the real view).
L∗r = PP(L∗0 , r ·V ,K), using (5)
= PP(L0,V0 + r ·V ,K), using (5)
= PP(L0,−r ·V + r ·V ,K)
= L0
• Outsourcing: Finally, the data owner outsources L∗0 , V , N
and K to the analyst.
4.1.2 Network Trace Analysis (Analyst). The analyst generates
the N views requested by the data owner, which is summarized in
Algorithm 2 in Appendix C and formalized below.
L∗0 , is the seed view
L∗i = PP(L∗i−1,V ,K), i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }
(7)
Since boundaries of partitions must be recognizable by the analyst
to allow him/her to generate the views, we modify the time-stamp
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Figure 5: An example of a trace which undergoes multi-view schemes I, II
of the records that are on the boundaries of each partition by chang-
ing the most significant digit of the time stamps which is easy to
verify and does not affect the analysis as it can be reverted back to
its original format by the analyst. Next, the analyst performs the
requested analysis on all N views and generates N analysis reports
Γ1, Γ2, · · · , ΓN .
4.1.3 Analysis Report Extraction (Data Owner). The data owner
is only interested in the analysis report that is related to the real
view, whichwe denote by Γr . Tominimize communication overhead,
instead of requesting all the analysis reports Γi of the generated
views, the data owner can fetch only the one that is related to
the real view Γr . He/she can employ the oblivious random accesses
memory (ORAM) [23] to do so without revealing the information
to the analyst (we will discuss alternatives in Section 6).
4.1.4 Security Analysis. We now analyze the level of indistin-
guishability provided by the scheme. Recall the indistinguisha-
bility property defined in Section 2; a multi-view mechanism is
ϵ-indistinguishable if and only if
∃ ϵ ≥ 0, s.t. ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N } ⇒
e−ϵ ≤ Pr (view i may be the real view)
Pr (view r may be the real view) ≤ e
ϵ
The statement inside the probability is the adversary’s decision on
a view, declaring it as fake or a real view candidate, using his/her
Sα knowledge. Moreover, we note that generated views differ only
in their IP values (fp-QI attributes are similar for all the views).
Hence, the adversary’s decision can only be based on the published
set of IPs in each view through comparing shared prefixes among
those IP addresses which he/she already know (Sα ). Accordingly,
in the following, we define a function to represent all the prefix
relations for a set of IPs.
Lemma 4.1. For two IP addresses a and b, function Q : {0, 1}32 ×
{0, 1}32 → N returns the number of bits in the prefix shared between
a and b
Q(a,b) = 31 − ⌊loдa⊕b2 ⌋
where ⌊.⌋ denotes the floor function.
Definition 4.1. For a multiset of n IP addresses S, the Prefixes
Indicator Set (PIS) R(S) is defined as follows.
R(S) = {Q(ai ,aj )| ∀ai ,aj ∈ S, i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n}} (8)
Note that PIS remains unchanged when CryptoPAn is applied
on S, i.e., R(PP(S,K)) = R(S). In addition, since the multi-view
solution keeps all the other attributes intact, the adversary can
identify his/her pre-knowledge in each view and construct prefixes
indicator sets out of them. Accordingly, we denote by Rα,i the PIS
constructed by the adversary in view i .
Definition 4.2. Let Rα be the PIS for the adversary’s knowledge,
and Rα,i , i ∈ {1, · · · ,N } be the PIS constructed by the adversary
in view i . A multi-view solution then generates ϵ-indistinguishable
views against an Sα adversary if and only if
∃ ϵ ≥ 0, s.t. ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N } ⇒
e−ϵ ≤ Pr (Rα,i = Rα )
Pr (Rα,r = Rα ) ≤ e
ϵ (9)
Lemma 4.2. The indistinguishability property, defined in equa-
tion 9 can be simplified to
∃ ϵ ≥ 0, s.t. ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N } ⇒
Pr (Rα,i = Rα ) ≥ e−ϵ
(10)
Proof. Pr (Rα,r = Rα ) = 1 as view r is the prefix preserving
output. Moreover, ∀ϵ ≥ 0 we have eϵ ≥ 1. □
From the above, we only need to show Rα,i = Rα (each gener-
ated view i is a real view candidate).
Theorem 4.3. Scheme I satisfies equation 10 with ϵ = 0.
Proof. Scheme I divides the trace into d (number of prefix
groups) partitions containing all the records that have similar pre-
fixes. Hence, for any partition Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ d), any two IP addresses a
and b inside Pi , and for anym,n ≤ N , we have Rm (a,b) = Rn (a,b)
because a and b are always assigned with equal key indices. More-
over, for any two IP addresses a andb in any two different partitions
and anym,n ≤ N , we have Rm (a,b) = Rn (a,b) = 0 since they do
not share any prefixes. □
The above discussions show that scheme I produces perfectly in-
distinguishable views (ϵ = 0). In fact, it is robust against the attack
explained in Section 3.3 and thus does not required IP migration,
because the partitioning algorithm already prevents addresses with
similar prefixes from going into different partitions (the case in
Figure 3). However, although adversaries cannot identify the real
view, they may choose to live with this fact, and attack each parti-
tion inside any (fake or real) view instead, using the same semantic
attack as shown in Figure 1. Note that our multi-view approach
is only designed to prevent attacks across different partitions, and
each partition itself is essentially still the output of CryptoPAn and
thus still inherits its weakness.
Fortunately, the multi-view approach gives us more flexibility in
designing specific schemes to further mitigate such a weakness of
CryptoPAn. We next present scheme II which sacrifices some indis-
tinguishability (in the sense of slightly less real view candidates) to
achieve better protected partitions.
4.2 Scheme II: Multi-view Using N Key Vectors
To address the limitation of our first scheme, we propose the next
scheme, which is different in terms of the initial anonymization
step, IP partitioning, and key vectors for view generation. The
data owner’s and the analyst’s actions are summarized in Algo-
rithms 3, 4.
4.2.1 Initial Anonymization with Migration. First, to mitigate
the attack on each partition, we must relax the requirement that
all shared prefixes go into the same partition. However, as soon as
we do so, the attack of identifying the real view through prefixes
shared across partitions, as demonstrated in Section 3.3, might
become possible. Therefore, we modify the first step of the multi-
view approach (initial anonymization) to enforce the IP migration
technique. Figure 6 demonstrates this. The original trace is first
anonymized with K0, and then the anonymized trace goes through
the migration process, which replaces the two different prefixes
(97.17 and 75.91) with different iterations of PP , as discussed in
Section 3.3.
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Figure 6: The updated initial anonymization (Step 1 in
Figure 2) for enforcing migration
4.2.2 Distinct IP Partitioning and N Key Vectors Generation. For
the scheme, we employ a special case of IP partitioning where each
partition includes exactly one distinct IP (i.e., the collection of all
records containing the same IP). For example, the trace shown in
Figure 5 includes three distinct IP addresses 150.10.10.1,128.10.10.1,
and 150.10.20.0. Therefore, the trace is divided into three parti-
tions. Next, the data owner will generate the seed view as in the
first scheme, although the key V0 will be generated completely
differently, as detailed below.
Let S∗ = {S∗1 , S∗2 , · · · , S∗d }, be the set of IP addresses after the
migration step. Suppose S∗ consists of D distinct IP addresses. We
denote by C∗ the multiset of totally D migration keys for those
distinct IPs (in contrast, the number of migration keys in C is
equal to the number of distinct prefixes, as discussed in Section 3.3).
Also, let PRNG(d,D, i) be the set of D random number generated
between [1,d] using a cryptographically secure pseudo random
number generator at iteration ith . The data owner will generate
N + 1 key vector Vi as follows.
Vi = PRNG(d,D, i) − PRNG(d,D, i − 1), (11)
∀i , r ∈ [1, 2 · · · ,N ]
and
V0 = PRNG(d,D, 0) − C∗ (12)
Vr = C∗ − PRNG(d,D, r − 1)
Example 4.1. In Figure 7, the migration and random vectors are
C∗ = [1 1 2], PRNG(2, 3, 0) = [1 2 2], PRNG(2, 3, 1) = [1 2 1], and
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Figure 7: An example of three views generation under
scheme II
PRNG(2, 3, 2) = [2 2 1], respectively. The corresponding key vectors
will be V0 = [0 1 0], V1 = [0 0 − 1] and V2 = [1 0 0] where only V1
and V2 are outsourced.
In this scheme, the analyst at each iteration i generates a new
set of IP addresses S∗i = {Si1, Si2, · · · , Sid } by randomly grouping
all the distinct IP addresses into a set of d prefix groups. In doing
so, each new vector Vi essentially cancels out the effect of the
previous vector Vi−1, and thus introduces a new set of IP addresses
S∗i consisting ofd prefix groups. Thus, it is straightforward to verify
that the r th generated view will prefix preserving (the addresses
are migrated back to their groups using C∗).
Example 4.2. Figure 7 shows that, in each iteration, a different
set (but with an equal number of elements) of prefix groups will be
generated. For example, in the seed view, IP addresses 150.10.20.0 and
128.10.10.1 are mapped to prefix group 11.215.
4.2.3 Indistinguishability Analysis. By placing each distinct IP
in a partition, our second scheme is not vulnerable to semantic
attacks on each partition, since such a partition contains no in-
formation about the prefix relationship among different addresses.
However, compared with scheme I, as we show in the following,
this scheme achieves a weaker level of indistinguishability (higher
ϵ). Specifically, to verify the indistinguishability of the scheme, we
calculate Pr (Rα = Rα,i ) for scheme II in the following. First, the
number of all possible outcomes of grouping D IP addresses into d
groups with predefined cardinalities is:
Ntotal =
D!
|S1 |!|S2 |! · · · |Sd |!
(13)
where |Si | denotes the cardinality of group i . Also the number of all
possible outcomes of grouping D IP addresses into d groups while
still having Rα,i = Rα is:
Nreal view candidates =
α ! (D − α)! ∑(dα)i=1 (Παi=1 |Sai |)
|S1 |!|S2 |! · · · |Sd |!
(14)
for some ai ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,d}. This equation gives the number of
outcomes when a specific set of α IP addresses (Sα ) are distributed
into α different groups and hence keeping Rα,i = Rα (i.e., the ad-
versary cannot identify collision). Note that term
∑(dα)
i=1
(
Παi=1 |Sai |
)
is all the combinations of choosing this α groups for the numerator
to model all the (|Sai | − 1)! combinations. Finally, we have
∀i ≤ N : Pr (Rα,i = Rα ) = Nreal view candidates
Ntotal
=
A = α !
∑(dα)
i=1
(
Παi=1 |Sai |
)
Πα−1i=0 (D − i)
≥ e−ϵ (15)
Thus, to ensure the ϵ-indistinguishability, the data owner needs to
satisfy the expression in equation 15which is a relationship between
the number of distinct IP addresses, the number of groups, the
cardinality of the groups in the trace and the adversary’s knowledge.
Theorem 4.4. The indistinguishability parameter ϵ of the gener-
ated views in scheme II is lower-bounded by
ln
[Dα
dα
· Πα−1i=0
(d − i)
(D − i)
]
(16)
Proof. Let b1,b2, · · · ,bn be positive real numbers, and for k =
1, 2, · · · ,n define the averagesMk as follows:
Mk =
∑
1≤i1≤i2≤···≤ik ≤n
bi1bi1 · · ·bik(n
k
) (17)
By Maclaurin’s inequality [29], which is the following chain of
inequalities:
M1 ≥ 2
√
M2 ≥ 3
√
M3 ≥ · · · ≥ n
√
Mn (18)
whereM1 =
n∑
i=1
bi
n , we have
A = α !
(d
α
)
Mα
Πα−1i=0 (D − i)
≤ Π
α−1
i=0 (d − i)(M1)α
Πα−1i=0 (D − i)
and sinceM1 =
n∑
i=1
|Si |
n =
D
d , we have
A ≤ D
α
dα
· Πα−1i=0
(d − i)
(D − i)
□
Figure 8(a) shows how the lower-bound in Equation 16 changes
with respect to different values of fraction d/D and also the ad-
versary’s knowledge. As it is expected, stronger adversaries have
more power to weaken the scheme which results in increasing ϵ
or increasing the chance of identifying the real view. Moreover,
as it is illustrated in the figure, when fraction d/D grows, ϵ tends
to converge to very small values. Hence, to decrease ϵ , the data
owner may increase d/D ∈ [0, 1] by grouping addresses based on a
bigger number of bits in their prefixes, e.g., a certain combination
of 3 octets would be considered as a prefix instead of one or two.
Another solution could be aggregating the original trace with some
other traces for which the cardinalities of each prefix group are
small. We study this effect in our experiments in Section 5 where
we illustrate the concept especially in Figures 10, 11.
Finally, Figure 8(b) shows how variance of the cardinalities af-
fects the indistinguishability for a set of fixed parameters d , D, α .
In fact, when the cardinalities of the prefix groups are close (small
σ ),A grows to meet the lower-bound in Theorem 4.4. Hence, from
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Figure 8: (a) The trend of bound 16 for ϵ when adversary’s
knowledge varies. (b) The trend of exact value of ϵ in
equation 15 for α = 8, d/D = 0.1 and when variance of
cardinalities varies
the data owner perspective, a trace with a lower variance of cardi-
nalities and a bigger fraction d/D has a better chance of misleading
adversaries who wants to identify the real view.
4.2.4 Security of the communication protocol. We now analyze
the security/privacy of our communication protocol in semi-honest
model under the theory of securemultiparty computation (SMC) [43],
[44].
Lemma 4.5. Scheme II only reveals the CryptoPan Key K and the
seed trace L∗0 in semi-honest model.
Proof. Recall that our communication protocol only involves
one-round communication between two parties (data owner to
data analyst). We then only need to examine the data analyst’s
view (messages received from the protocol), which includes (1) N :
number of views to be generated, (2) K : the outsourced key, (3)
L∗0 : the seed trace, and (4) V1,V2, · · · ,VN : the key vectors. As we
discuss in section 4.2.3, the probability of identifying the real view
by the adversary using all provided information (key and vectors)
depends on the adversary knowledge and the trace itself which
clearly implies that such “leakage” is trivial.
Indeed, each of N and V1,V2, . . . ,VN can be simulated by gen-
erating a single random number from a uniform random distri-
bution (which proves that they are not leakage in the protocol).
Specifically, the number of generated views N is integer which
is bounded by N0, where N0 is the maximum number of views
the data owner can afford and all the entries in V1,V2, · · · ,VN are
in [−d,d] where d is the number of groups. First, given integer
0 < N ∈ N ∗, the probability that N is simulated in the domain
would be Pr [Simulator = N ] = 1N ∗ . Then, N can be simulated
in polynomial time (based on the knowledge data analyst already
knew, i.e., his/her input and/or output of the protocol). Similarly, all
the random entires in V1,V2, · · · ,VN can also be simulated in poly-
nomial time using a similar simulator (only changing the bound).
Thus, the protocol only reveals the outsourced key K and the seed
trace L∗0 in semi-honest model. □
Note that outsourcing the L∗0 and the outsourced key are trivial
leakage. The outsourced key can be considered as a public key and
leakage of L∗0 which is considered as the output of the protocol was
studied earlier. Finally, we study the setup leakage and show that
the adversary cannot exploit outsourced parameters to increase
ϵ (i.e., decrease the number of real view candidates) by building
his/her own key vector.
Lemma 4.6. (proof in Appendix A.2) For an Sα adversary, who
wants to obtain the least number of real view candidates, if condi-
tion (2d − 2)D > N holds, the best approach is to follow scheme II,
(scheme II returns the least number of real view candidates).
4.3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss various aspects and limitations of our
approach.
(1) Application to EDB: We believe the multi-view solution
may be applicable to other related areas. For instance, pro-
cessing on encrypted databases (EDB) has a rich literature
including searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [53], [54],
fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) [55], oblivious RAMs
(ORAM) [44], functional encryption [56], and property pre-
serving encryption (PPE) [57], [58]. All these approaches
achieve different trade-offs between protection (security),
utility (query expressiveness), and computational efficiency [60].
Extending and applying the multi-view approach in those
areas could lead to interesting future directions.
(2) Comparing the Two Schemes:As we discussed in the two
schemes, scheme I achieves a better indistinguishability but
less protected partitions in each view. Figure 14 compares
the relative effectiveness of the two schemes on a real trace
under 40% adversary knowledge. In particular, Figure 14(a)
,(b) demonstrate the fact that despite the lower number of
real view candidates in scheme II compared with scheme I (30
vs 160 out of 160), the end result of the leakage in scheme II
is much more appealing (3%vs 35%). Therefore, our experi-
mental section has mainly focused on scheme II.
(3) Choosing the Number of Views N : The number of views
N is an important parameter of our approach that deter-
mines both the privacy and computational overhead. The
data owner could choose this value based on the level of
trust on the analysts and the amount of computational over-
head that can be afforded. Specifically, as it is implied by
Equation 10 and demonstrated by our experimental results
in section 5, the number of real view candidates is approx-
imately e−ϵ · N . The data owner should first estimate the
adversary’s background knowledge α (number of prefixes
known to the adversary) and then calculate ϵ either using
Equation 15 or (approximately) using Equation 16. As it is
demonstrated in Figures 8(a) and 9(b), a bigger α results in
weaker indistinguishability and demands a larger number of
views to be generated. An alternative solution is to increase
the number of prefix groups (D) by sacrificing some prefix
relations among IPs, e.g., grouping them based on first 3
octets.
(4) Utility: The main advantage of the multi-view approach
is it can preserve the data utility while protecting privacy.
In particular, we have shown that the data owner can re-
ceive an analysis report based on the real view (Γr ) which is
prefix-preserving over the entire trace. This is more accurate
than the obfuscated (through bucketization and suppression)
or perturbed (through adding noise and aggregation) ap-
proaches. Specifically, in case of a security breach, the data
owner can easily compute Lr (migration output) to find the
mapped IP addresses corresponding to each original address.
Then the data owner applies necessary security policies to
the IP addresses that are reported violating some policies in
Γr . A limitation of our work is it only preserve the prefix of
IPs, and a potential future direction is to apply our approach
to other property-preserving encryption methods such that
other properties may be preserved similarly.
(5) Communicational/Computational Cost:One of our con-
tributions in this paper is to minimize the communication
overhead by only outsourcing one (seed) view and some sup-
plementary parameters. This is especially critical for large
scale network data like network traces from the major ISPs.
On the other hand, one of the key challenges to the multi-
view approach is that it requires N times computation for
both generating the views and analysis.
Our experiments in Figure 11 shows that generating 160
views for a trace of 1milion packets takes approximately
4 minutes and we describe analytic complexity results in
Tables 3 and 4. We note that the practicality of N times com-
putation will mainly depends on the type of analysis, and
certainly may become impractical for some analyses under
large N . How to enable analysts to more efficiently conduct
analysis tasks based on multiple views through techniques
like caching is an interesting future direction. Another direc-
tion is to devise more accurate measures for the data owner
to more precisely determine the number of views required
to reach a certain level of privacy requirement.
5 EXPERIMENTS
This section evaluates our multi-view scheme through experiments
with real data.
5.1 Setup
To validate our multi-view anonymization approach, we use a set
of network traces collected by a real ISP. We focus on attributes
Timestamp, IPaddress , and PacketSize in our experiments, and
the meta-data are summarized in the table in Figure 9(a). In order
to measure the security of the proposed approach, we implement
the frequency analysis attack [60], [4]. This attack can compro-
mise individual addresses protected by existing prefix-preserving
anonymization in multi-linear time [4]. We stress that in the setting
of EDBs (encrypted database systems), an attack is successful if it
recovers even partial information about a single cell of the DB [60].
Accordingly, we define the information leakage metric to evaluate
the effectiveness of our solution against the adversary’s semantic
attacks. Several measures have been proposed in literature [3, 31]
to evaluate the impact of semantic attacks. Motivated by [3], we
model the information leakage (number of matches) as the number
of records/packets, their original IP addresses are known by the
adversary either fully or partially. More formally,
Information leakage metric [3]: We measure Fi defined as the
Attribute Value
Type Header
Start date
End date
Size 
Format 
Distinct IP addresses 
Number of packets
Header
August 1st, 2016
October 21st, 2016
70 GB
pcap and TXT
883
1M
(a) (b)
Figure 9: (a) Metadata of the collected traces (b) ϵ for
different number of prefix groups and different adversary
knowledges
total number of addresses that has at least i most significant bits
known, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 32}.
To model adversarial knowledge, we define a set of prefixes
to be known by the adversary ranging from 10% up to 100% of
all the prefixes in the trace. This knowledge is stored in a two
dimensional vector that includes α different addresses and their key
indexes. Next, using our multi-view scheme, we generate all the
N views. However, before we apply the frequency analysis attack,
we simulate how an adversary may eliminate some fake views
from further consideration as follows. For each view, we check if
two addresses from the adversary’s knowledge set with different
prefixes now share prefixes in that view. If we find such a match in
the key indices, the corresponding view will be discarded from the
set of the real view candidates and will not be considered in our
experiments since the adversary would know it is a fake view.
We validate the effectiveness of our scheme by showing the
number of real view candidates and the percentage of the packets
in the trace that are compromised (i.e., the percentage of IP packets
whose addresses have at least eight most significant bits known).
Each experiment is repeated more than 1, 000 times and the end
results are the average results of the frequency analysis algorithm
applied to each of the real view candidates.
Moreover, evaluating the utility preservation and studying the
scalability of using ORAM in our scheme are respectively discussed
in Appendix B.2 and B.3.
We conduct all experiments on a machine running Windows
with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700 3.40 GHz CPU, 4 GB Memory,
and 500 GB storage.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Information Leakage Analysis. First, the numerical results
of the indistinguishability parameter ϵ under different adversary’s
knowledges are depicted in Figure 9(b). Those results correspond to
three different cases, i.e., when addresses are grouped based on (1)
only the first octet (136 groups), (2) the first and the second octets
(417 groups), and (3) the first three octets (506 groups). As we can
see from the results, ϵ decreases (meaning more privacy) as the
number of prefix groups increases, and it increases as the amount
of adversarial knowledge increases.
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Figure 10: Percentage of the compromised packets (out of 1M) and number of real view candidates when number of views
and the adversary knowledge vary and for the three different cases (1) Figures (a),(d) (2) Figures (b),(e) (3) Figures (c),(f) where
legends marked by CP denote the CryptoPAn result whereas those marked byMV denote the multi-view results
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Figure 11: Computation time obtained by our
anonymization approach for different prefix grouping
cases
We next validate those numerical results through experiments in
Figure 10. Specifically, we first analyze the behavior of our second
multi-view scheme (introduced in Section 4.2) before comparing
the two schemes in Appendix B. Figure 10 presents different facets
of information leakage when our approach is applied in various
grouping cases. The results in Figure 10 are for adversaries who
has knowledge of no more than most 50% of the prefix groups
(Figure 13 in Appendix B.1 presents the more extreme cases for
the same experiments, i.e., up to 100% knowledge). The analysis of
these figures is detailed in the following.
Effect of the number of prefix groups: As we discuss earlier,
three different IP grouping cases are studied. Figures 10 (a) and
(d) shows respectively the results of packet leakage and number
of real view candidates when d = 136. As the numerical results in
Figure 8 anticipates, because the fraction d/D = 0.154 is relatively
low, the indistinguishability of generated views diminishes specially
for stronger adversary knowledges. Consequently, the adversary
discards more views and the rate of leakage increases, compared
with Figures 10 (b), (e) and Figures 10 (c), (f) for which the fraction
d/D are 0.47 and 0.57, respectively. In particular, for the worst case
of 50% adversary knowledge and when the number of views is less
than 50, we can verify that the number of real view candidates for
case (1) remains 1 resulting in packet leakage comparable to that
of CryptoPAn.
Effect of the number of views: As it is illustrated in the figure,
increasing the number of views always improves both the number
of real view candidates and the packet leakages. All the figures for
real view candidates evaluation, show a near linear improvement
where the slope of this improvement inversely depends on the
adversary’s knowledge. For the packet leakages, we can note that
the improvement converges to a small packet leakage rate under a
large number of views. This is reasonable, as each packet leakage
result is an average of leakages in all the real view candidates.
However, since each of the fake views leaks a certain amount of
information, increasing the number of views beyond a certain value
will no longer affect the end result. In other words, the packet
leakage converges to the average of leakages in the (fake) real view
candidates. Finally, the results show that our proposed scheme can
more efficiently improve privacy by (1) increasing the fraction d/D
(number of views/number of distinct addresses) or (2) increasing
the number of views. The first option may affect utility (since
inter-group prefix relations will be removed), while the second
option is more aligned with our objective of trading off privacy
with computation.
5.2.2 Computational Overhead Evaluation. We evaluate the com-
putational overhead incurred by our approach. Figure 11 shows
the time required by our scheme in each grouping cases, when the
number of views varies for a trace including one million packets.
We observe that, when the number of views increases, the com-
putational overhead increases near linearly. However, each case
shows a different slope depending on the number of groups. This
is reasonable as our second scheme generates key vectors with a
larger number of elements for more groups, which leads to applying
CryptoPAn for more iterations (see complexity analysis in Appen-
dix D). Finally, linking this figure to the information leakage results
shown in Figure 10 demonstrates the trade-off between privacy and
computational overhead.
6 RELATEDWORK
In the context of anonymization of network traces, as surveyed
in [18], many solutions have been proposed [2, 4, 8, 12, 13]. Gener-
ally, these may be classified into different categories, such as enu-
meration [19], partitioning [21], and prefix-preserving [22, 25]. These
methods include removing rows or attributes, suppression, and gen-
eralization of rows or attributes [34]. Some of the solutions [8, 31]
are designed to address specific attacks and are generally based
on the permutation of some fields in the network trace to blur the
adversary’s knowledge. Later studies either prove theoretically [5]
or validate empirically [14] that those works may be defeated by
semantic attacks.
As our proposed anonymization solution fall into the category
of prefix-preserving solutions, which aims to improve the utility,
we review in more details some of the proposed solutions in this
category. First effort to find a prefix preserving anonymization was
done by Greg Minshall [48] who developed TCPdpriv which is a
table-based approach that generates a function randomly. Fan et
al. [3] then developed CryptoPAn with a completely cryptographic
approach. Several publications [4], [8, 31] have then raised the
vulnerability of this scheme against semantic attacks which moti-
vated query based [17] and bucketization based [2] solutions. In
the following we review those works in more details.
Among the works that address such semantic attacks, Riboni et
al. [2] propose a (k,j)-obfuscation methodology applied to network
traces. In this method, a flow is considered obfuscated if it cannot
be linked, with greater assurance, to its (source and destination) IPs.
First, network flows are divided into either confidential IP attributes
or other fields that can be used to attack. Then, groups of k flows
having similar fingerprints are first created, then bucketed, based
on their fingerprints into groups of size j < k . However, utility
Table 2: Summary of proposed network traces
anonymization in literature
Authors Privacy against semantic attacks Utility
Slagell et al. [47] Violated Prefix preserving
McSherry et al. [17] Preserved Noisy aggregated results
Pang et al. [8] Violate Partial prefix preserving
Riboni et al. [2] Preserved Heavily sanitized
Ribeiro et al. [31] Violated Partial prefix preserving
Mogul et al. [15] Violated Aggregated results
remains a challenge in this solution, as the network flows are heavily
sanitized, i.e., each flows is blurred inside a bucket of k flows having
similar fingerprints. An alternative to the aforementioned solutions,
called mediated trace analysis [15, 16], consists in performing the
data analysis on the data-owner side and outsourcing analysis
reports to researchers requesting the analysis. In this case, data
can only be analyzed where it is originally stored, which may not
always be practical, and the outsourced report still needs to be
sanitized prior to its outsourcing [17]. In contrast to those existing
solutions, our approach improves both the privacy and utility at
the cost of a higher computational overhead. Table 2, summarizes
the most important network trace anonymization schemes, over
past twenty years[18] and their main characteristics.
The last step of our solution requires data owner to privately
retrieve an audit report of the real view, which can be based on
existing private information retrieval (PIR) techniques. A PIR ap-
proach usually aims conceal the objective of all queries independent
of all previous queries [20, 38]. Since the sequence of accesses is not
hidden by PIR while each individual access is hidden, the amortized
cost is equal to the worst-case cost [20]. Since the server computes
over the entire database for each individual query, it often results in
impracticality for large databases. On the other hand, ORAM [39]
has verifiably low amortized communication complexity and does
not require much computation on the server but rather periodically
requires the client to download and reshuffle the data [20]. For
our multi-view scheme, we choose ORAM as it is relatively more
efficient and secure, and also the client (data owner in our case) has
sufficient computational power and storage needed to locally store
a small number of blocks (audit reports in our case) in a local stash.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a multi-view anonymization ap-
proach mitigating the semantic attacks on CryptoPAn while pre-
serving the utility of the trace. This novel approach shifted the
trade-off from between privacy and utility to between privacy and
computational cost; the later has seen significant decrease with the
advance of technology, making our approach a more preferable
solution for applications that demand both privacy and utility. Our
experimental results showed that our proposed approach signifi-
cantly reduced the information leakage compared to CryptoPAn.
For example, for the extreme case of adversary pre-knowledge of
100%, the information leakage of CryptoPAN was 100% while under
approach it was still less than 10%. Besides addressing various limi-
tations discussed in Appendix 4.3, our future works will adapt the
idea to improve existing privacy-preserving solutions in other areas,
e.g., we will extend our work to the multi-party problem where
several data owners are willing to share their traces to mitigate
coordinated network reconnaissance by means of distributed (or
inter-domain) audit [51].
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A PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. 3.1 We must show that c = a. To do so, we use induction:
c1 = b1 ⊕ f0(λ), b1 = a1 ⊕ f0(λ)
⇒ c1 = a1 ⊕ f0(λ) ⊕ f0(λ) = a1
where λ is empty string and f0(λ) is a constant bit in {0, 1} that de-
pends only on padding function and cryptographic key K . Assume
∀j < k ; c j = aj , thus:
ck = bk ⊕ fk−1(c1 · · · ck−1)
and: ∀j < k ; c j = aj , bk = ak ⊕ fk−1(a1 · · ·ak−1)
⇒ ck = ak ⊕ fk−1(a1 · · ·ak−1) ⊕ fk−1(a1 · · ·ak−1) = ak
□
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.6
Proof. Suppose there exists algorithm A which returns the
smallest set of key vectors Vs to reverse the seed trace and ob-
tain the minimum number of real view candidates, given our setup.
Also denote by V the set of those key vectors if the adversary
follows scheme II. We now show that if (2d − 2)D > N holds
then we have V = Vs . First, note that the key indices of different
distinct addresses in L∗0 is PRNG(d,D, 0). Therefore, the adver-
sary has to guess V = C∗ − PRNG(d,D, 0). However, note that
elements of V are in [−d + 1,d − 1] and there will be (2d − 2)D
different combinations for V . Thus to minimize this number, the
adversary has to use the outsourced parameters which means we
have A(L∗0 ,K ,V1, · · · ,VN ,Sα ) = Vs . However, we showed earlier
that all these inputs are trivial leakage. Therefore, if (2d − 2)D > N
holds, we have V = Vs . □
B EXPERIMENTS
In this section, using experiments, we measure the security of the
proposed approach against very strong adversaries. In addition,
we evaluate the utility of the approach using two real network
analyses. Finally, we justify the choice of ORAM in our setup using
a comprehensive study on the scalability of ORAM in the literature.
B.1 Privacy Evaluation against Very Strong
Adversaries
Figure 13 shows the leakage and the real view candidates results
for stronger adversaries (α ∈ [60, 100]). Note that in this figures, we
only show results for case (2) and (3) as results in case (1) does not
show a significant improvement compared with CryptoPAn results
because the multi-view approach with fraction of d/D = 0.154
cannot defeat the adversary’s knowledge (ϵ > 16).
B.2 Utility Evaluation Using Real-life Network
Analytics
Figure 12 shows the results of two different network analytics over
the original trace (1M records), the real view and one of the fake
views generated in our multi-view solution. In the first experiment,
we present IP distribution [61] in the trace; reporting the number of
distinct addresses within each subnet (IP group). We compare the
distribution of distinct IP addresses inside the aforementioned three
traces for both temporal distribution; if subnets are indexed based
on their time stamps; and cardinality-based distribution result; if
subnets are indexed based on their cardinalities. We found that
our results (both distributions) generated from the original trace
and the real view are identical (see Figure 12(a)). This is reasonable
because the real view is a prefix preserving mapping of IPs that
keeps the fp-QI attributes intact (preserving both distributions).
Moreover, the cardinality based distribution result generated from
the fake view is identical to those in the original trace and the
real view (see Figure 12(c)). Note that the later is resulted from the
indistinguishability of our multi-view solution.
In the second experiment, we present a packet-level analytic [17].
In particular, Figure 12(d,e) shows the empirical cumulative distri-
bution function results for the three traces. Our results clearly show
that the original trace and our scheme results are identical as multi-
view will not have any impact on fingerprinting quasi identifier
attributes.
B.3 Multi-view and the Scalability of ORAM
In practice, we expect analysis reports would have significantly
smaller sizes in comparison to the views, and considering the one
round communication with ORAM (O(loдN )-complexity), we be-
lieve the solution would have acceptable scalability. Experiments
using our dataset and existing ORAM implementation (an imple-
mentation [62] of non-recursive Path-ORAM [64] has been made
public) would further confirm this. We generated various set of
analyses reports using snort [63], and we found that for our dataset
the size of audit reports are in the range of KB which is perfect to
be used in fast ORAM protocols, e.g., Path-ORAM. Specifically, for
Path-ORAM, Figure 5 (b) in [62] shows a less than 1MB commu-
nication overhead for the worst-case cost of up to 224 number of
blocks of size 4KB.
C ALGORITHMS
Input:
L: Original network trace
K0, K : Cryptographic keys
d : Number of prefix groups
partition(L,d): IP partitioning
r : Iteration number of the real view.
V : Random vectors, of size d
Output:
L∗: Anonymized trace to be outsourced
Function: anonymize (L,d,K0,K , r ,V )
begin
1 L := PP(L,K0)
2 V0 := −r ·V
3 P := partition(L,d)
4 L∗ := ϕ
5 foreach Pi ∈ P do:
6 Li := GetFlows(L, Pi )
7 L∗i := PP(Li ,V0(i),K)
8 L∗ := L∗ ∪ L∗i
9 end
10 return L∗, K ,V ,N
end
Algorithm 1: Data owner: Trace anomymization (scheme I)
FollowingAlgorithms are summarized versions of the data owner’s
and the analyst’s roles in our multi-view scheme presented in sec-
tion 4.
Algorithm 1: The data owner’s actions (scheme I).
Algorithm 2: The analyst’s actions (scheme I).
Algorithm 3: The data owner’s actions (scheme II).
Algorithm 4: The analyst’s actions (scheme II).
D COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Here, we discuss the overhead analysis, from both the data owner’s
and the data analyst’s side. In particular, table 3 summarizes the
Input:
L∗: Seed trace
N : Number of iterations requested by
data owner
d : Number of prefix groups
partition(L∗,d): IP partitioning
K : Outsourced key
V : Vector of size d defined by data owner
CV (L∗): Compliance verification
Output:
Γi : Analysis report of ith view L∗i ,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ,N }
Function: analysis (L∗,d,partition(L∗,d),K ,N ,V )
begin
1 P := partition(L∗,d)
2 for i = 1 : N do:
3 L∗i := ϕ
4 foreach Pj ∈ P do:
6 Li, j := GetFlows(L∗i−1, Pj )
7 L∗i, j := PP(Li, j ,V (j),K)
8 L∗i := L∗i ∪ L∗i, j
9 end
10 Γi := CV (L∗i )
11 return Γi
12 end
end
Algorithm 2: Analyst: Network trace analysis (scheme I)
overhead for all the action items in the data owner side. Here, C(n)
is the computation overhead of CryptoPAn and D is the number of
the distinct IP addresses. Finally, table 4 summarizes the overhead
for all the action items in the data analyst side where N .CV (n) is
the cost of N times verifying the compliances (auditing).
Table 3: Overhead on the data owner side
Blocks in Multi-view Computation Overhead Communication Overhead
Initial anonymization C(n) —
Migration function O(nloдn) +
∑d
i=1 C(i)
d C(n) —
Prefix grouping — —
Index generator N .O(D) N .O(D)
Seed trace
∑D
i=1V0(i)
D C(n) O(n)
Report retrieval (ORAM) — O(loдN )ω(1)
Table 4: Overhead on the data analyst side
Blocks in Multi-view Computation Overhead Communication Overhead
Seed view — O(n)
N views generation
∑N
i=1
∑D
j=1Vi (j)
D C(n) —
Compliance verification (Analysis) N .CV (n) —
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Figure 12: Distribution of distinct IP addresses in different subnets (IP groups) (out of 1M) (a) for the original trace, the real
view and one of the fake views based on the order they appear in the trace (temporal distribution), (b) for the original trace
and the real view and (c) for the fake view, based on the cardinalities of the subnets in an ascending order (cardinality-based
distribution). Empirical CDF for the packet lengths in (e),(f) the original trace and the real view, and the fake view,
respectively.
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Figure 13: Percentage of the compromised packets (out of
1M) and number of real view candidates when number of
views and the adversary knowledge vary and for case (1)
Figures (b),(e) (2) Figures (c),(f) where legends marked by
CP denote the CryptoPAn result whereas those marked by
MV denote the multi-view results
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Figure 14: Comparison between scheme I and scheme II
with 137 partitions (prefix groups based on first octet
sharing). Figure (a): Percentage of the compromised
packets (out of 1M) and Figure (b): Number of real view
candidates for 40% adversary knowledge
Input:
L: Original network trace
K0, K : Cryptographic keys
D: Number of IPs
d : Number of prefix groups
Miдration(L,d): Migration function
partition(L,D): IP partitioning
r : Iteration number of the real view.
V0,V1, · · · ,VN : Vectors of size D defined by data owner
Output:
L∗: Anonymized trace to be outsourced
Function: anonymize (L,d,D,K0,K , r ,V )
begin
1-1 L := PP(L,K0)
1-2 L := Miдration(L,d)
2 V0 := −r ·V
3 P := partition(L,D)
4 L∗ := ϕ
5 foreach Pi ∈ P do:
6 Li := GetFlows(L, Pi )
7 L∗i := PP(Li ,V0(i),K)
8 L∗ := L∗ ∪ L∗i
9 end
10 return L∗, K ,V1,V2, · · · ,VN ,N
end
Algorithm 3: Data owner: Trace anomymization (scheme II)
Input:
L∗: Seed trace
N : Number of iterations requested by
data owner
d : Number of prefix groups
D: Number of partitions
partition(L∗,D): IP partitioning
K : Outsourced key
V0,V1, · · · ,VN : Vectors of size D defined by data owner
CV (L∗): Compliance verification
Output:
Γi : Analysis report of ith view L∗i ,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ,N }
Function: analysis
(L∗,D,partition(L∗,D),K ,N ,V1,V2, · · · ,VN )
begin
1 P := partition(L∗,D)
2 for i = 1 : N do:
3 L∗i := ϕ
4 foreach Pj ∈ P do:
6 Li, j := GetFlows(L∗i−1, Pj )
7 L∗i, j := PP(Li, j ,Vi (j),K)
8 L∗i := L∗i ∪ L∗i, j
9 end
10 Γi := CV (L∗i )
11 return Γi
12 end
end
Algorithm 4: Analyst: Network trace analysis (scheme II)
